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1 Introduction
The objective of mechanism design is to construct mechanisms (or game forms) such that privately
informed agents have an incentive to reveal their information to a principal who seeks to realize a
social choice function. The revelation principle establishes that if any mechanism can induce the
agents to report their information, then the agents will also have an incentive to report truthfully
in the direct mechanism. Given the beliefs of the agents, the truthtelling constraints then reduce,
in the direct mechanism,- to the Bayesian incentive compatibility conditions.
There are two important limitations of Bayesian incentive compatibility analysis. First, the
analysis typically assumes a commonly known common prior over the agentstypes. This assump-
tion may be too stringent in practice. In the spirit of the Wilson doctrine(Wilson (1987)), we
would like implementation results that are robust to di¤erent assumptions about what agents do
or do not know about other agentstypes. Second, the revelation principle only establishes that
the direct mechanism has an equilibrium that achieves the social choice function. In general, there
may be other equilibria that deliver undesirable outcomes. We would like to achieve full imple-
mentation, i.e., show the existence of a mechanism all of whose equilibria deliver the social choice
function. We studied the rst robustness problem in an earlier work, Bergemann and Morris
(2005b). The second full implementationproblem has been the subject of a large literature. In
the incomplete information context, key full implementation references are Postlewaite and Schmei-
dler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991). In this paper, we study robust
implementationwhere we require robustness and full implementation simultaneously.
Interim implementation on all type spaces is possible if and only if it is possible to implement
the social choice function using an iterative deletion procedure. We refer to the resulting notion as
rationalizable implementation. We x a mechanism and iteratively delete messages for each payo¤
type that are strictly dominated by another message for each payo¤ type prole and message prole
that has survived the procedure. This observation about iterative deletion illustrates a general point
well-known from the literature on epistemic foundations of game theory (e.g., Brandenburger and
Dekel (1987), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003)): equilibrium solution concepts only have bite if we
make strong assumptions about type spaces, i.e., we assume small type spaces where the common
prior assumption holds.
We exploit this equivalence between robust and rationalizable implementation to obtain nec-
essary and su¢ cient conditions for robust implementation in general environments. Our necessity
argument is conceptually novel, exploiting the iterative characterization. The necessary conditions
for robust implementation are ex post incentive compatibility of the social choice function and a
condition - robust monotonicity - that is equivalent to requiring Bayesian monotonicity on every
2
type space. Suppose that we x a deceptionspecifying, for each payo¤ type i of each agent, a
set of types that he might misreport himself to be. We require that for some agent i and a type
misreport of agent i under the deception, for every misreport 0 i that the other agents might make
under the deception, there exists an outcome y which is strictly preferred by agent i to the outcome
he would receive under the social choice function for every possible payo¤ type prole that might
misreport 0 i; where this outcome y satises the extra restriction that no payo¤ type of agent
i prefers outcome y to the social choice function if the other agents were really types 0 i. This
condition - while a little convoluted - is easier to interpret than the interim (Bayesian) monotonicity
conditions.
The su¢ ciency argument requires only a modest strengthening of the necessary condition by
guaranteeing that the preference prole of each agent satises a (conditional) no total indi¤erence
property. Under this no total indi¤erence property, we show that the necessary conditions are also
su¢ cient for robust implementation. The su¢ cient conditions guarantee robust implementation in
pure, but more generally also in mixed strategies. Our robust analysis thus removes the frequent
gap between pure and mixed strategy implementation in the literature.
In this paper, we follow the classic implementation literature in allowing for arbitrary mecha-
nisms, including modulo and integer games. By allowing for these mechanisms, we are able to make
tight connections with the existing implementation literature. Allowing for these badly behaved
mechanisms does complicate our analysis: for example, we must allow for transnite iterated dele-
tion of best responses in our denition of rationalizable implementation. Given the complications
arising from innite mechanisms, we report new necessary conditions for robust implementation in
the context of nite mechanisms. We also report how our earlier research can be used to show that
these necessary conditions are su¢ cient conditions for nite mechanisms either in well-behaved,
but restricted, environments (Bergemann and Morris (2007)) or under a virtual rather than exact
implementation requirement (Bergemann and Morris (2008c)).
Our results extend the classic literature on Bayesian implementation due to Postlewaite and
Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991). We focus in this paper on
an indirect approach to extending these results. We rst note the equivalence between robust
implementation and rationalizable implementation. We then exploit the equivalence to report a
direct argument showing that robust monotonicity is a necessary and almost su¢ cient condition for
rationalizable implementation. But in the light of the classic literature, we know that a necessary
and almost su¢ cient condition for robust implementation must be Bayesian monotonicity on all
type spaces. We conrm and clarify our results by directly checking that robust monotonicity
is equivalent to Bayesian (or interim) monotonicity on all type spaces. Figure 1 gives a stylized
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Figure 1: Relationship between Bayesian and Robust Implementation / Monotonicity
In the implementation literature, it is a standard practice to obtain the su¢ ciency results
with augmented mechanisms. By augmenting the direct mechanism with additional messages, the
designer may elicit additional information about undesirable equilibrium play by the agents. Yet,
in many applied economic settings, single crossing or supermodular preference assumptions allow
direct implementation. In a companion paper, Bergemann and Morris (2007), we provide necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for robust implementation in the direct mechanism. The main results of
this paper apply to environments where each agents type prole can be aggregated into a one
dimensional su¢ cient statistic for each player and where the preferences are single crossing with
respect to this statistic. These restrictions incorporate many economic models with interdependence
in the literature. We show that besides an incentive compatibility condition, in this case the strict
ex post incentive compatibility condition, a contraction property which requires that there is not
too much interdependence in agentstypes, together present necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
robust implementation in direct mechanisms.
The robust monotonicity condition is stronger than both the Maskin and the Bayesian monotonic-
ity conditions. In the context of robust implementation, it is then natural to ask whether a relax-
ation from the exact to the virtual implementation condition may lead to more permissive results.
In Bergemann and Morris (2008c) we characterize the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for ro-
bust virtual implementation. There we show that a social choice function can be robustly virtually
implemented if and only if the social choice function is ex post incentive compatible and robust
measurable. In this contribution, we note that robust measurability remains a necessary condition
for robust (exact) implementation, but it is not su¢ cient anymore.
The results in this paper concern full implementation. An earlier paper of ours, Bergemann and
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Morris (2005b), addresses the analogous questions of robustness to rich type spaces, but looking at
the question of partial implementation, i.e., does there exist a mechanism such that some equilib-
rium implements the social choice function. We showed that ex post (partial) implementation of
the social choice function is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for partial implementation on all
type spaces.1 This paper establishes that an analogous result does not hold for full implementation.
In a related paper, Bergemann and Morris (2008a), we therefore investigate the notion of ex
post implementation. The necessary and su¢ cient conditions there straddle the implementation
conditions for Nash and Bayesian-Nash respectively, as an ex post equilibrium is a Nash equilib-
rium at every incomplete information (Bayesian) type prole. However in contrast to the iterative
argument pursued here, the basic reasoning in Bergemann and Morris (2008a) invokes more tradi-
tional equilibrium arguments. By comparing the conditions for ex post and robust implementation,
it becomes apparent that robust implementation typically imposes additional constraints on the
allocation problem. In Bergemann and Morris (2008a), we showed that in single crossing environ-
ments, the same single crossing conditions which guarantee incentive compatibility also guarantee
full implementation. In contrast, in the aggregation environment discussed above, we show that
robust implementation imposes a strict bound on the interdependence of the preferences, which is
not required by the truthtelling conditions. A contraction mapping behind the iterative argument
directly points to the source of the restriction of the interaction term.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal environment
and solution concepts. Section 3 establishes necessary conditions for robust implementation in nite
mechanisms. In addition, we present restrictions on the environment and weaker implementation
notions under which the necessary conditions are also su¢ cient conditions. Section 4 establishes
the relation between rationalizable and robust implementation in innite mechanisms. Section
5 reports our main result on the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for robust implementation.
Section 6 discusses extensions and variations of our implementation results, examining the role of
lotteries and pure strategies and the relationship with Nash equilibrium and ex post equilibrium
implementation. The appendix contains some additional examples.
1This result does not extend to social choice correspondences.
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2 Setup
2.1 The Payo¤ Environment
We consider a nite set of agents, 1; 2; :::; I. Agent is payo¤ type is i 2 i. We write  2  =
1     I . There is a set of outcomes Z. We assume that each i and Z are countable.2 Each
individual has a von Neumann Morgenstern utility function ui : Z   ! R. Thus we are in the
world of interdependent types, where an agents utility depends on other agentspayo¤ types. We
allow for lotteries over deterministic outcomes.3 Let Y , (Z) and extend ui to the domain Y 
in the usual way:
ui (y; ) ,
X
z2Z
y (z)ui (z; ) .
A social choice function is a mapping f :  ! Y . If the true payo¤ type prole is , the planner
would like the outcome to be f (). In this paper, we restrict our analysis to the implementation
of a social choice function rather than a social choice correspondence or set.4
2.2 Type Spaces
We are interested in analyzing behavior in a variety of type spaces, many of them with a richer
set of types than payo¤ types. For this purpose, we shall refer to agent is type as ti 2 Ti, where
Ti is a countable set. A type of agent i must include a description of his payo¤ type. Thus there
is a function bi : Ti ! i with bi (ti) being agent is payo¤ type when his type is ti. A type of
agent i must also include a description of his beliefs about the types of the other agents; thus there
is a function bi : Ti ! (T i) with bi (ti) being agent is belief type when his type is ti. Thusbi (t i) [ti] is the probability that type ti of agent i assigns to other agents having types t i. A type







A planner must choose a game form or mechanism for the agents to play in order to determine the
social outcome. Let Mi be the countably innite set of messages available to agent i. We denote
2The countable types restriction claries the relation to the existing literature. We postpone until Section 6.3 a
discussion of what happens if we allow for uncountable payo¤ types, types and pure outcomes.
3The role of the lottery assumption and what happens when we drop it are discussed in Section 6.1.
4One reason why the extension to social choice correspondences is not straightforward is that, with social choice
correspondences, the incentive compatibility conditions that arise from requiring partial implementation are typically
weaker than ex post incentive compatibility, as shown by examples in Bergemann and Morris (2005b).
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the generic message by mi 2 Mi and let m 2 M = M1     MI . Let g (m) be the distribution
over outcomes if action prole m is chosen. Thus a mechanism is a collection
M = (M1; :::;MI ; g ()) ;
where g :M ! Y .
2.4 Solution Concepts
Now holding xed the payo¤ environment, we can combine a type space T with a mechanismM to
get an incomplete information game (T ;M). The payo¤ of agent i if message prole m is chosen
and type prole t is realized is then given by
ui

g (m) ;b (t) .
A pure strategy for agent i in the incomplete information game (T ;M) is given by
si : Ti !Mi.
A (behavioral) strategy is given by
i : Ti ! (Mi) .
The objective of this paper is to obtain implementation results for interim, or Bayesian Nash,
equilibria on all possible types spaces.5 The notion of interim equilibrium for a given type space T
is dened in the usual way.
Denition 1 (Interim equilibrium)
A strategy prole  = (1; :::; I) is an interim equilibrium of the game (T ;M) if, for all i, ti and

















1Aui g  m0i;m i ;b (t) bi (t i) [ti]
for all m0i.
5We label these interimequilibria rather than Bayesianequilibria in light of the fact that our type space does
not necessarily have a common prior.
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Requiring "robust" implementation, i.e., for "all type spaces", will push the solution concept
in the direction of rationalizability. Consequently we dene a message correspondence prole S =
(S1; :::; SI), where each
Si : i ! 2Mi (1)
and we write S for the collection of message correspondence proles. The collection S is a lattice
with the natural ordering of set inclusion: S  S0 if Si (i)  S0i (i) for all i and i. The largest




, where Si (i) = Mi for each i and i. The smallest element is S =
(S1; :::; SI), where Si (i) = ? for each i and i.
We dene an operator b to iteratively eliminate never best responses. To this end, we denote
the belief of agent i over message and payo¤ type proles of the remaining agents by
i 2 (M i  i) :
The operator b : S ! S is now dened as:









i (m i;  i)ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i))
P
m i; i




We observe that b is increasing by denition: i.e., S  S0 ) b (S)  b (S0). By Tarskis xed





(ii) b (S) = S ) S  SM. We can also construct the xed point SM by starting with S - the
largest element of the lattice - and iteratively applying the operator b. If the message sets and











But because the mechanism M may be innite, transnite induction may be necessary to reach
the xed point.6 It is useful to dene







6Lipman (1994) contains a formal description of the transnite induction required (for the case of complete
information, but nothing important changes with incomplete information). As he notes we remove strategies which
are never a best reply, taking limits where needed.
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again using transnite induction if necessary. Thus SMi (i) are the set of messages surviving
(transnite) iterated deletion of never best responses. SMi (i) is the set of messages that type i
might send consistent with knowing that his payo¤ type is i, common knowledge of rationality
and the set of possible payo¤ types of the other players, but no restrictions on his beliefs and higher
order beliefs about other types.
If message sets are nite (or compact), a well known duality argument implies that never best
responses are equivalent to strictly dominated actions. However, the equivalence does not hold
with innite (non-compact) message sets.7 In a compact message analysis, Chung and Ely (2001)
consider a version of this solution concept in an incomplete information mechanism design context
with dominated (not strictly dominated) messages deleted at each round. We observe that the
solution concept dened through the iterative application of the operator b is weaker than the
notion of interim rationalizability for a given type space T .8 Under b, every agent i is allowed to
hold arbitrary beliefs about  i and is not restricted to a particular posterior distribution over
 i. On the other hand, if the type space T were the universal type space, then SMi (i) would be
equal to the union of all interim rationalizable actions of agent i over all types ti 2 Ti whose payo¤
type prole coincides with i, or bi (ti) = i. We refer to SMi (i) as the rationalizable messages of
type i of agent i in mechanismM.
2.5 Implementation
We now dene the notions of interim, robust and rationalizable implementation.
Denition 2 (Interim Implementation)
Social choice function f is interim implemented on type space T by mechanism M if the game
(T ;M) has an equilibrium and every equilibrium  of the game (T ;M) satises
 (mjt) > 0) g (m) = f
b (t) .
We note that a tradition in the implementation literature commonly restricts attention to pure
strategy equilibria, but we allow mixed strategy equilibria.
7The following simple example (suggested to us by Andrew Postlewaite) illustrates the non-equivalence. Players
1 and 2 each choose a non-negative integer, k1 and k2 respectively. The payo¤ to player 1 from k1 = 0 is 1. The
payo¤ to player 1 from action k1  1 is 2 if k1 > k2, 0 otherwise. For any belief that player 1 has about 2s actions,
there is a (su¢ ciently high) action from player 1 that gives him a payo¤ greater than 1. Thus action 0 is never a best
response for player 1. However, for any mixed strategy of player 1, there is a (su¢ ciently high) action of player 2
such that action 0 is a better response for player 1 than the mixed strategy. Thus action 0 is not strictly dominated.
8For the notion of interim rationalizability, see Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris
(2007).
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Denition 3 (Robust Implementation)
Social choice function f is robustly implemented by mechanism M if, for every T , f is interim
implemented on type space T by mechanismM. Social choice function f is robustly implementable
if there exists a mechanismM such that f is robustly implemented by mechanismM.
We observe that the notion of robust implementation requires that we can nd a mechanism
M which implements f for every type space T . A weaker requirement would be to ask that for
every type space T there exists a, possibly di¤erent, mechanism M such that f is implemented.
This weaker notion would still lead to the same necessary condition as the stronger implementation
version we pursue here, and we believe that it would not lead to a substantial change in the
su¢ ciency conditions either.
The notion of robust implementation requires that a social choice function f can be interim
implemented for all type spaces T . As we look for necessary and su¢ cient conditions for robust
implementation, conceptually there are (at least) two approaches to obtain the conditions.
One approach would be to simply look at the interim implementation conditions for every
possible type space T and then try to characterize the intersection or union of these conditions for
all type spaces. This is the approach we initially pursued, and it works in a brute force kind of
way. In Section 6.1, we review what happens under this approach.
But we focus our analysis on a second, more elegant, approach. We rst establish an equivalence
between robust and "rationalizable implementation" and then derive the necessary conditions for
robust implementation as an implication of rationalizable implementation. The advantage of the
second approach is that after establishing the equivalence, we do not need to argue in terms of large
type spaces, but rather derive the results from a novel argument using the iterative elimination
process.
Denition 4 (Rationalizable Implementation)
Social choice function f is implemented in rationalizable strategies by mechanism M if, for all
, SM () 6= ? and if for all  and m; m 2 SM ()) g (m) = f ().
We now report a formal epistemic argument that relates the rationalizable messages to the set
of messages that might be played in any equilibrium on any type space.
Proposition 1 (Rationalizable Actions)
mi 2 SM (i) if and only if there exists a type space T , an interim equilibrium  of the game
(T ;M) and a type ti 2 Ti such that (i) i (mijti) > 0 and (ii) bi (ti) = i.
10




mi 2 SMi (i)	 :
Let bi (mi; i) , i.
By (2), we know that for each mi 2 SMi (i), there exists 
mi;i
i 2 (M i  i) such that:
mi;ii (m i;  i) > 0) mj 2 S
M













 0; 8m0i 2Mi.
Let bi (m i;  i) [mi; i] , mi;ii (m i;  i) .





i ) = m

i and b (mi ; i ) = i .
(() Suppose there exists a type space T , an equilibrium  of (T ;M), and mi 2Mi and ti 2 Ti
such that i (mi jti ) > 0 and bi (ti ) = i . Let
Si (i) =
n
mi : i (mijti) > 0 and bi (ti) = i for some ti 2 Tio .
Now interim equilibrium conditions ensure that b (S)  S. Thus S  SM. Thusmi 2 SMi
bi (ti ),
which concludes the proof.
Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) showed an equivalence for nite action complete information
games between the set of actions surviving iterated deletion of strictly dominant actions and the
set of actions that could be played in a subjective correlated equilibrium. Proposition 1 is a
straightforward generalization of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) to incomplete information and
innite actions. The innite action extension (for complete information) was shown in Lipman
(1994). The nite action incomplete information extension is reported in a recent paper of Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (2003) (following an earlier analysis in Battigalli (1999)).
3 Finite Mechanisms
A complicating element in using the relationship between equilibrium strategies and rationalizable
strategies in the implementation context is the fact that the augmented mechanisms often have
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innite message spaces and that best responses may not exist. These complications are inherent to
the entire implementation literature and we therefore have to carefully address these issues before we
establish the implementation results. In this section we restrict attention to nite mechanisms, i.e.
where each Mi is nite and we extend the argument to innite mechanisms in the next section. We
note that all the results in this section will extend to more general well-behavedmechanisms (e.g.,
compact mechanism or mechanisms where best responses always exist as in Abreu and Matsushima
(1992b)).
With nite mechanisms, proposition 1 immediately implies an equivalence between robust and
rationalizable implementation.
Corollary 1 (Equivalence)
Social choice function f is robustly implemented by mechanismM if and only if it is rationalizably
implemented by mechanismM:
We now establish necessary conditions for robust implementation which use the equivalence
between robust and rationalizable implementation.
3.1 Ex Post Incentive Compatibility
The following ex post incentive compatibility condition is a necessary condition for robust truthful
(or partial) implementation as established in Bergemann and Morris (2005b).
Denition 5 (EPIC)
Social choice function f satises ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) if









for all i, i, 0i and  i.
In the context of robust (full) implementation, we require a strict version of the ex post incentive
compatibility conditions.
Denition 6 (Semi-Strict EPIC)
Social choice function f satises semi-strict ex post incentive compatibility (semi-strict EPIC) if,
for each i, i, 0i,  i,























The necessity of the semi-strict version of ex post incentive compatibility now follows directly
from the conditions imposed by rationalizable implementation.
Proposition 2 (Necessity of Semi-Strict EPIC)
If social choice function f is robustly implementable by a nite mechanism, then f satises semi-
strict EPIC.
Proof. If mechanism M robustly implements f , then, for each i, there exists mi : i ! Mi
such that
g (m ()) = f () and m () 2 SM () ;
(we can simply let mi (i) be any element of S
M
i (i)).





















 ui (f () ; ) . (4)




























































Next we present two related, yet distinct, monotonicity conditions which are at the core of the
robust implementation results.
3.2 Robust Monotonicity
To understand the robust monotonicity condition, it is useful to rst think about agents playing
the direct mechanism. In the direct mechanism, an agent i may or may not report truthfully. A
deception is a set-valued prole  = (1; :::; I), where




with i 2 i (i) for all i and all i. A deception of agent i with payo¤ type i is a set of possible
reports by agent i. By denition, a deception of payo¤ type i includes, but is not restricted to, i
itself.
Denition 7 (Acceptable / Unacceptable Deception)




= f (). A deception is unacceptable if it is not
acceptable.
In this language, the truthtellingdeception, dened by i (i) , i for all i is an acceptable
deception. Other deceptions of agent i may also be acceptable if the social choice function does not
vary with respect to some subset of reports of agent i for all type proles of the other agents. The
inverse mapping of a deception i represents the set of true type proles i which could lead to a








0i 2 i (i)	 :
A robust monotonicity condition is key to our main result. In the direct mechanism, where





any 0i. But once we allow augmented mechanisms, we could conceivably o¤er agent i a larger set of
lotteries if he reports deviant behavior of his opponents. We need to identify, for any given report
 i, the set of lotteries with the property that whatever agent is actual type, he would never prefer





ui  y;  0i;  i  ui  f  0i;  i ;  0i;  i for all 0i 2 i	 . (5)
Henceforth, we refer to the set Yi ( i) as the reward set (for agent i).
Suppose now that it was common knowledge that in the direct mechanism, type i of agent i
will send a report 0i 2 i (i). If  is acceptable, we would know that f was being implemented.
But if  is unacceptable, we must nd a type of some agent who is prepared to report that other
agents are misreporting. But for the whistle-blowerwho is going to report that we are in a bad
equilibrium, we cannot know what he believes about the types of the other agents, nor can we know
what message he expects to hear except that it is a message consistent with the deception. We
thus have to allow for all possible beliefs  i of agent i over payo¤ types  i 2  i consistent with
a report 0 i from a given deception prole , or







Finally, the reward that he is o¤ered must not mess up the truth-telling behavior in the good
equilibrium. This gives the following condition:
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Denition 8 (Dual Robust Monotonicity)
Social choice function f satises dual robust monotonicity if, for every unacceptable deception ,


























































the inequality (7) is strict.
We call this the dualversion of robust monotonicity because, in the special case where the
pure outcome space Z and payo¤ type spaces i are nite, dual robust monotonicity can be given
a simpler expression.
Denition 9 (Robust Monotonicity)
Social choice function f satises robust monotonicity if, for every unacceptable deception , there














































inequality (8) is strict.
The equivalence of robust monotonicity and dual robust monotonicity when the pure outcome
space Z and payo¤ type spaces i are nite is established in Lemma 2 in the appendix.
Proposition 3 (Necessity of Dual Strict Robust Monotonicity)
If social choice function f is robustly implementable by a nite mechanism, then f satises dual
strict robust monotonicity.
Proof. Fix an unacceptable deception . Let bk be the largest k such that for every i, i and





 SM;k̂i (i) .
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We know that such a bk exists because Sk̂i \ SMi  0i = SMi  0i and, since M implements f , we




= ?. Now we know that there exists i and 0i 2 i (i) such that











Let bmi 2 SM;k̂i (i) \ SMi  0i ,
and bmi =2 SM;k̂+1i (i) \ SMi  0i .
Since message bmi gets deleted for i at round bk + 1, we know that for every i 2 (M i  i)
such that
i (m i;  i) > 0) mj 2 SM;k̂j (j) for all j 6= i,
there exists mi such thatX
m i; i
i (m i;  i)ui (g (m

i ;m i) ; (i;  i)) >
X
m i; i
i (m i;  i)ui (g (bmi;m i) ; (i;  i)) .
Let bmj 2 SMj  0j ;
for all j 6= i. Now the above claim remains true if we restrict attention to distributions i putting
probability 1 on bm i. Thus for every  i 2 ( i) such that
 i ( i) > 0) bmj 2 SM;k̂j (j) for all j 6= i,
there exists mi such thatX
 i
 i ( i)ui (g (m

i ; bm i) ; (i;  i)) >X
 i
 i ( i)ui (g (bmi; bm i) ; (i;  i)) .
But bm 2 SM  0, so (sinceM robustly implements f), g (bmi; bm i) = f  0. Also observe that if
0 i 2  i ( i), then bm i 2 SM;k̂ i ( i). Thus for every  i 2    1 i  0 i, there exists mi such
that X
 i
 i ( i)ui (g (m












which establishes the reward inequality, (6), of dual strict robust monotonicity.
Now suppose the incentive inequalities, (7), are not satised strictly, and hence:
ui

g (mi ; bm i) ;ei; 0 i  ui f ei; 0 i ;ei; 0 i
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m0i; bm i ;ei; 0 i , (9)
since bm i 2 SMi  0 i, we must have mi 2 SMi ei and thus g (mi; bm i) = f  i; 0 i. Thus from







m0i; bm i ;ei; 0 i
and, for all ei, if
ui

g (mi ; bm i) ;ei; 0 i  ui f ei; 0 i ;ei; 0 i ,
then g (mi ; bm i) = f ei; 0 i.













 i ( i)ui (g (m












which concludes the proof.
3.3 Robust Measurability
We now present a distinct necessary condition for robust implementation. We will be interested
in the set of preferences that an agent might have if his payo¤ type is i and he knows that the
type j of each opponent j belongs to some subset 	j of his payo¤ types j . Write R for the set
of expected utility preference relations on lotteries Y . We will write Ri; i 2 R for the preference
relation of agent i if his payo¤ type is i and he has belief  i 2 ( i) about the types of others:












We write Ri (i;	 i) for the set of preferences agent i might have if his payo¤ type is i and he




R = Ri; i for some  i 2 (	 i)	 .
Say that type set prole 	 i separates 	i if\
i2	i
Ri (i;	 i) = ?.
Let  = (i)
I
i=1 2 Ii=12i be a prole of type sets for each agent. Say that  is mutually
inseparable if, for each i and 	i 2 i, there exists 	 i 2  i such that 	 i does not separate 	i.
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Denition 10 (Robust Measurability)














If payo¤ types are nite, one can give an alternative iterative denition of robust measurability:




























Proposition 4 (Necessity of Robust Measurability)
If social choice function f is robustly implementable by a nite mechanism, then f satises robust
measurability.
Proof. Since f is robustly implementable, there exists a mechanismM such that
m 2 SM ()) g (m) = f () .
Now suppose  is mutually inseparable. We argue by induction that, for all i, 	i 2 i and k there
exists a set of messages ? 6= Mki (	i)  S
M;k
i (i) for all i 2 	i. This is true by denition for
k = 0. Suppose that it is true for k. Now  mutually inseparable implies that for any 	i 2 i,
there exists 	 i 2  i, R and, for each i 2 	i, ii 2 (	 i) such that Ri;ii = R. Now let
Mk+1i (	i) be the optimal messages of agent i when he believes that his opponents will sent some
message prole in Mk i (	 i) with probability 1 and has beliefs 
i
i about the type prole of his
opponents, i.e.,















By construction, ? 6= Mk+1i (	i)  S
M;k
i (i) for all i 2 	i. Now for each 	i 2 i, Mki (	i)
is a decreasing sequence under set inclusion. Since Mi is nite, there exists ? 6= Mi (	i) =
\
k0
Mki (	i). Thus M







 	i, there exists








. Now x any m i 2 SM i ( i), and
9See Lemma 3 of Bergemann and Morris (2008c).
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In Appendix B, we show by means of two examples that robust monotonicity does not imply
nor is it implied by robust measurability.
We have pursued two ways of deriving su¢ cient conditions in prior work. First, we identied
natural restrictions on the environment that make these necessary conditions su¢ cient (Bergemann
and Morris (2007)). Second, we showed what happened if we weaken the implementation require-
ment to virtual implementation (Bergemann and Morris (2008c)). We briey review these results
below. If we neither put restrictions on the environment nor allow virtual implementation, then we
do not know how to derive tight su¢ cient conditions for nite, or other well-behaved, mechanisms.
However, as in the existing complete information and standard Bayesian implementation literature,
it is possible to obtain tight conditions if we allow for badly behaved mechanisms. These results
are reported in the remainder of the paper. We believe they improve our understanding about
how the di¤erent elements in the incomplete information implementation literature t together and
highlight the role of innite mechanisms.
3.4 Single Crossing Aggregator Environments
In Bergemann and Morris (2007), we consider payo¤ environments in which each payo¤ type space
i is completely ordered and where there exist for each i, an aggregator function hi :  ! R and
a valuation function vi : Y  R! R such that
vi (y; hi ()) , ui (y; ) , (12)
where hi is continuous and strictly increasing in i and vi : Y  R! R is continuous and satises
the following strict single crossing property: for all  < 0 < 00,





















The aggregator functions h = (hi)
I
i=1 are said to satisfy the contraction property if, for all deceptions














for all  i and 0 i 2  i ( i). In single crossing aggregator environments as described by (12)
and (13), the contraction property is equivalent to both dual strict robust monotonicity and robust
measurability.
We say that a social choice function f is responsive if for all i 6= 0i, there exists  i such that




. If a social choice function is responsive, then semi-strict EPIC simplies
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all i, i 6= 0i and  i.
Proposition 5 (Contraction Property)
In a single crossing aggregator environment, a responsive social choice function f is robustly imple-
mentable if and only if it satises strict ex post incentive compatibility and the contraction property.
This result is reported in Theorem 1 and 2 of Bergemann and Morris (2007). It follows that
the necessary conditions of propositions 2, 3 and 4 are also su¢ cient in these environments. Note
that in the discrete type setting of this paper, the continuity properties are automatically satised
if the payo¤ type spaces are nite. Bergemann and Morris (2007) allowed for compact payo¤ type
spaces and pure outcome spaces. Bergemann and Morris (2007) also showed that when robust
implementation is possible, it is possible in a directmechanism where agents report just their
payo¤ types.
3.5 Robust Virtual Implementation
The necessary conditions for robust implementation also become su¢ cient conditions if we relax
the requirement from (robust) exact to (robust) virtual implementation. In Bergemann and Morris
(2008c), we consider settings where the space of pure outcomes and payo¤ types are nite. By
Corollary 1 we can therefore dene robust virtual implementation directly with reference to the
rationalizable messages in a given mechanismM.
Denition 11 (Robust Virtual Implementation)
Social choice function f is robustly virtually implementable if, for each " > 0, there exists a mecha-
nismM such that for all , SM () 6= ? and if for all  and m; m 2 SM ()) kg (m)  f ()k  ".
We established in Theorem 1 and 2 of Bergemann and Morris (2008c) the following necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for robust virtual implementation.
Proposition 6 (Robust Measurability)
A social choice function is robustly virtually implementable if and only if it satises ex post incentive
compatibility and robust measurability.
Thus strict robust monotonicity can be dropped and semi-strict EPIC can be weakened to EPIC
if virtual implementation is enough. With these weakenings, the necessary conditions are su¢ cient.
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3.6 A Coordination Example
We conclude this section with an example that demonstrates that while robust implementation
is a strong requirement, it is weaker than dominant strategies. In the example there are two
agents, i = 1; 2. Each agent i has two possible types, i and 0i. There are six possible outcomes:
Z = fa; b; c; d; z; z0g. The payo¤s of the agents are a function of the allocation and the true payo¤




1 3; 3 0; 0




1 0; 0 3; 3




1 0; 0 1; 1




1 1; 1 0; 0






1 2; 2 2; 0




1 2; 0 2; 2
01 2; 0 2; 2
:







Clearly, the social choice function is strictly ex post incentive compatible. But in the direct
mechanismwhere each agent simply reports his type, there will always be an equilibrium where
each type of each agent misreports his type, and each agent gets a payo¤ of 1. This is also strictly
ex post incentive compatible. The social choice function f which selects among fa; b; c; dg embeds
a coordination game. We further observe that the payo¤ for agent 1 from allocations z and z0 are
equal and constant for all type proles. On the other hand, the payo¤ of agent 2 from z and z0
depends on his type but not on the type of the other agent.
We now consider the following augmented, but nite, mechanism which responds to the messages







The augmented mechanism enriches the message space of agent 1 by a single message . The
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corresponding incomplete information game has the following payo¤s:
type 2 02
type action 2 02 2 
0
2
1 1 3; 3 0; 0 0; 0 3; 3
01 0; 0 1; 1 1; 1 0; 0
 2; 2 2; 0 2; 0 2; 2
01 1 0; 0 1; 1 1; 1 0; 0
01 3; 3 0; 0 0; 0 3; 3
 2; 2 2; 0 2; 0 2; 2
Suppose we iteratively remove actions for each type that could never be a best response given the
type action proles remaining. Thus in the rst round, we would observe that type 1 would never
send message 01 and type 
0
1 would never send message 1. Knowing this, we could conclude that
type 2 would never send message 02 and type 
0
2 would never send message 2. This in turn implies
that neither type of agent 1 will ever send message . Thus the only remaining message for each
type of each agent is truth-telling. But now they must behave this way in any equilibrium on any
type space.
4 Rationalizable and Robust Implementation in Innite Mecha-
nisms
In Section 3 we established the equivalence between rationalizable and robust implementation for
nite mechanisms. A complicating factor is that augmented mechanisms often have innite message
spaces and so best responses may not exist. We now address these issues for innite mechanisms
and then establish the implementation results for general mechanisms.
4.1 Best Response
We observe that with innite mechanisms there is no a priori guarantee that SM (i) is non-empty
or that a game of incomplete information dened by (T ;M) has an interim equilibrium. The
epistemic result of Proposition 1 which related the rationalizable messages with the equilibrium
messages for some type space continues to hold, vacuously, in these cases. But for implementation
results, we care about existence. We introduce the following two conditions that relate existence of
equilibrium on all type spaces to the actions surviving iterated deletion. These conditions use the
notion of message correspondence S dened in Section 2.4.
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Denition 12 (Ex Post Best Response)
Message correspondence S satises the ex post best response property if, for all i and i 2 i, there
exists mi 2 Si (i) such that
mi 2 argmax
mi2Mi
ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i)) ;
for all  i and m i 2 S i ( i).
We observe that for S to satisfy the ex post best response property, Si (i) must be non-empty
for all i and all i.
Denition 13 (Interim Best Response)
Message correspondence S satises the interim best response property if, for all i and  i 2 ( i),
there exists i 2 (M i  i) such that:
1. i (m i;  i) > 0) mj 2 Sj (j) for each j 6= i;
2. for all  i 2  i : X
m i2M i
i (m i;  i) =  i ( i) ;





i (m i;  i)ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i)) :
The interim best response property only requires that for every conjecture over payo¤ type
spaces, there exists some beliefs over messages consistent with the message correspondence S, such
that a best response is in the message correspondence. In particular, it does not require that a best
response exists for all possible beliefs over message proles. Note that the ex post best response
property is a stronger requirement than the interim best response property, but that the interim
best response property also implies that SMi (i) is non-empty for all i and i.
Proposition 1 linked every action prole in the set of rationalizable actions to an equilibrium
action for some type space T . Proposition 7 strengthens the relationship between rationalizable and
equilibrium actions, after imposing some structure on the best response property of rationalizable
and equilibrium actions, respectively.
Proposition 7 (Best Response Properties)
1. If SM has the ex post best response property, then (T ;M) has an equilibrium for each T .
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2. If (T ;M) has an equilibrium for each T , then SM satises the interim best response property.
Proof. (1.) By the ex post best response property, there exists, for each i, si : i ! Mi such
that












for all  i. Now x any type space. The strategy prole s with




is an equilibrium of the game (T ;M).
(2.) Suppose (T ;M) has an equilibrium for each T . Fix any i and  i 2 ( i). Fix any type
space T with, for each i 2 i, a type ti (i) such that (a) bi (ti (i)) = i for each i, (b) there
exists i 2 (T i) such that bi (ti (i)) = i for all i and (c)X
ft i:b i(t i)= ig
i (t i) =  i ( i) (17)
for all i and  i. The game has an equilibrium . Let mi be any message with i (mijti (i)) > 0.
Let
i (m i;  i) =
X
ft i2T i:b i(t i)= ig
 i (m ijt i)i (t i) .
Now i (mijti (i)) > 0 implies




i (m i;  i)ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i)) .
Proposition 1 implies that every message prole mj which is played in equilibrium by type j is
part of the set SM, or that:
i (m i;  i) > 0) mj 2 SMj (j) for each j 6= i.
By construction of the type space T , in particular property (c) as expressed by (17), this implies
that X
m i2M i
i (m i;  i) =  i ( i) for all  i 2  i.
Since these properties hold for arbitrary i and  i 2 ( i), SM satises the interim best response
property, which concludes the proof.
It is unfortunate that there is a gap between the necessary and su¢ cient conditions in the
above proposition. However, an example in the appendix shows that it is possible to construct
(admittedly silly) mechanisms where (T ;M) has an equilibrium for each T , but SM fails the ex
post best response property.
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4.2 Material Implementation
We can maintain the relationship between rationalizable and robust implementation, despite the
possibility of non-existence of an interim best response, by qualifying the implementation condition
as being material.
Denition 2M (Material Interim Implementation).
Social choice function f is materially interim implemented on type space T by mechanism M if
every equilibrium  of the game (T ;M) satises
 (mjt) > 0) g (m) = f
b (t) ;
for all t.
In contrast to the earlier denition of interim implementation, given in Denition 2, we allow
the premise of the denition to be vacuous. In other words, the mechanism M might have the
property that on a given type space, there is no equilibrium. Our terminology mirrors the language
of modal logic where proposition A materially implies B whenever A is false, as well as when both
A and B are true, see Hughes and Creswell (1996). We similarly weaken the denition of robust
and rationalizable implementation.
Denition 3M (Material Robust Implementation).
Social choice function f is materially robustly implemented by mechanism M if, for every T , f is
materially interim implemented on type space T by mechanism M.
Denition 4M (Material Rationalizable Implementation).
Social choice function f is materially rationalizably implemented by mechanism M if for all 
and m; m 2 SM ()) g (m) = f ().
With these weaker notions of material implementation Proposition 1 now immediately implies
an equivalence between material robust and material rationalizable implementation in the presence
of innite mechanisms.
Corollary 2 (Equivalence)
Social choice function f is materially rationalizably implemented byM if and only if f is materially
robustly implemented by mechanismM.
Proposition 7 gave the slightly messier result relating equilibrium existence and properties of
messages surviving iterated deletion. The following corollary gives the immediate implications for
our implementation denitions:
25
Corollary 3 (Necessary Conditions)
1. If social choice function f is materially rationalizably implemented by mechanismM and SM
satises the ex post best response property, then f is robustly implemented byM.
2. If f is robustly implemented byM, then f is materially rationalizably implemented by mech-
anismM and SM satises the interim best response property.
The material qualication will only be used in the necessity part of Theorem 1 where we
shall invoke the second part of Corollary 3. There we shall use the xed-point property of SM,
stated earlier in (2), to derive the robust monotonicity condition. In the su¢ ciency part of the
proof, a non-empty set SM is obtained in the augmented mechanism by virtue of ex post incentive
compatibility. The following implication of rationalizable implementation will be used to establish
robust monotonicity in Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 (Truthtelling as Best Response)
If f is materially rationalizably implemented by mechanism M and SM satises the interim best





ui (f (i;  i) ; (i;  i)) 
X
m i
i (m i)ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i)) (18)
for all mi 2Mi and i 2 i.
Proof. Applying the denition of the interim best response property for i and the degenerate









i (m i)ui ((mi;m i) ; (i;  i))  SMi (i) for all i 2 i.
But by material rationalizable implementability, m 2 SM ()) g (m) = f (). So
ui (f (i;  i) ; (i;  i)) 
X
m i
i (m i)ui ((mi;m i) ; (i;  i)) ;
for all mi 2Mi and i 2 i.
Lemma 1 shows how small the gap between the ex post and interim best response property is.
It establishes that truthtelling is a best response against some beliefs over messages m i for any
given payo¤ type prole  i.
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5 Innite Mechanisms
We will need a very weak economic condition to ensure that it is always possible to reward and
punish each agent independently of the other agents.
Denition 14 (Conditional No Total Indi¤erence)
The conditional no total indi¤erence (NTI) property is satised if, for all i, all  and all  i 2






















The conditional no total indi¤erence property imposes a very weak restriction on the preferences.
For example, if there are a nite number of pure outcomes and an agent is never completely
indi¤erent between all lotteries, then we can always nd interior outcomes y and y0 such that the
conditional no total indi¤erence condition is met. The conditional NTI property, together with the
use of lotteries, renders an additional no veto property, which typically appears in the su¢ cient
conditions, obsolete. In addition, we can omit the usual cardinality assumption of I  3. A related
no total indi¤erence condition appears in the context of virtual implementation in Duggan (1997),
who requires it to hold at every ex post prole  and in Serrano and Vohra (2005), who require it
at the interim level for a given belief  i ( i) of player i.
Theorem 1 (Robust Implementation)
1. If f is robustly implementable, then f satises EPIC and dual robust monotonicity;
2. If f satises EPIC, dual robust monotonicity and the conditional NTI property, then f is
robustly implementable.
Proof. (1.) We rst prove that robust implementability implies EPIC and dual robust monotonic-
ity. We do so by appealing to the necessary conditions for robust implementation in Corollary 3.






ui (f (i;  i) ; (i;  i)) 
X
m i
i (m i)ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i)) ;









for all m i 2 SM i ( i). So










for all 0i 2 i.
We next establish dual robust monotonicity. Fix an unacceptable deception  and suppose that
f is materially rationalizably implementable. There must exist a message correspondence prole S
such that






 Si (i) ; (19)





* bi (S) [i] ; (20)
for all i, i and 0i 2 i (i). The existence of such an S can be established constructively. Clearly
S satises (19). Iteratively apply the operator b. By rationalizable implementation, there exists k















By (20), simply pick
bmi 2 Si (i) \ SMi  0i and bmi =2 bi (S) [i] \ SMi  0i .
Since message bmi =2 bi (S) [i], we know that for every i 2 (M i  i) such that
i (m i;  i) > 0) mj 2 Sj (j) for all j 6= i,
there exists mi such thatX
m i; i
i (m i;  i)ui (g (m

i ;m i) ; (i;  i)) >
X
m i; i
i (m i;  i)ui (g (bmi;m i) ; (i;  i)) .
(22)
Next we identify a particular belief i (m i;  i) for which the inequality (22) holds. By (18) in































for all mi 2Mi and 00i 2 i. Thus for any  i 2 ( i), we can set
i (m i;  i) = i (m i) i ( i) .
Applying the above claim (22), there exists mi such that:X
 i;m i
 i ( i) i (m i)ui (g (m

i ;m i) ; (i;  i)) >
X
 i;m i
 i ( i) i (m i)ui (g (bmi;m i) ; (i;  i)) .
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But i (m i) > 0) (bmi;m i) 2 SM  0, so by material rationalizable implementation:
g (bmi;m i) = f  0 :
We also observe that as we dened S to be the set obtained after the k-th iteration of the operator







, there exists mi such thatX
 i;m i
 i ( i) i (m i)ui (g (m

i ;m i) ; (i;  i)) >
X
 i;m i










Now, the inequality (24) essentially establishes guarantees the reward inequality for robust monotonic-




g (mi ;m i) i (m i) :



































.10 And by (24) we then have:X
 i












(2.) We now prove that EPIC, dual robust monotonicity and the conditional NTI property imply
robust implementation. We do so by explicitly constructing the implementing mechanism. The
mechanism will use interior lotteries over the deterministic outcome set Z and over the reward
sets Yi ( i). Given an arbitrary labelling of the outcome set Z = fz0; z1; :::; zk; :::g, we dene an
interiorlottery over the set Z by
y = (y0; y1; :::; yk; :::) ; (25)
where
yk , Pr (z = zk) =
k
1   ;
for some  2 (0; 1). For every given prole  i, the reward set Yi ( i) is by construction a
convex set with at most a countable number of extreme points. We denote the set of extreme
10Note that this step implies that even if we had restricted attention to mechanisms with deterministic outcomes, our
robust monotonicity condition would only have established that there exists a lottery (not necessarily a deterministic
outcome) su¢ cient to reward a whistle-blower.
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points of Yi ( i) by Y i ( i) and for some labelling of the points in the set we have Y

i ( i) =
y0; i ; y1; i ; :::; yl; i ; :::
	
. An extreme point yl; i in Y

i ( i) may be a deterministic or a random
outcome and assigns probability yl; i (zk) to the pure outcome zk. For every reward set Y i ( i),
we dene a interiorlottery:
y i =
 










where the lottery y i is a compound lottery.










, where m1i 2 i, m2i 2 Z+,
m3i :  i ! Y with m3i ( i) 2 Yi ( i), m4i 2 Y . The outcome g (m) is determined by the following
rules:




























pick the interior lottery y (as dened in 25).





) m2i = 1). Suppose that i has conjecture i 2 (M i  i). We can partition the





j = 1 for all j 6= i and m1 i =  i
	
;
and cM i = m i : m2j > 1 for some j 6= i	 .
By the conditional NTI property, we know that there exists m4i 2 Y such that, ifX
m i2cM i; i2 i










i (m i;  i)ui (y; ) .

















































an even better response, contradiction.


















First observe that EPIC implies that i 2 i (i). We will argue that if  is not acceptable, then
b (S) 6= S. By robust monotonicity, we know that there exists i, i, 0i 2 i (i) such that, for all


























But now for any conjecture i 2 
n
(m i;  i) : m2j = 1 for all j 6= i
o
, there exists m3i (with
































is never a best response for type i.


















then  is acceptable. Thus f is materially rationalizably implemented.
Finally observe that SM must satisfy the ex post best response property, with type i sending








, so robust implementation is possible by Corollary 2.
We deliberately allowed for very badly behaved innite mechanisms in order to make a tight
connection with the existing literature and to get tight results. Many authors have argued that
integer game constructions, like that we use in Theorem 1, should be viewed critically (see,
e.g., Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) and Jackson (1992)). In our analysis of nite mechanisms in
Section 3, the best responses were always well dened. As we saw there, the relationship between
rationalizable and robust implementation is much simpler with the restriction to nicemechanisms,
where best responses exists for all conjectures.
Part 1 of the above theorem represents a slight weakening of the necessary conditions of Propo-
sitions 2 and 3: semi-strict EPIC is weakened to EPIC and strict dual robust monotonicity is
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weakened to dual robust monotonicity. These weaker conditions arise from allowing badly behaved
mechanisms. Part 2 of the above theorem shows that they are also su¢ cient when combined with
an no total indi¤erence property.
The proof directly uses the link between rationalizable and robust implementation for the ne-
cessity as well as the su¢ ciency part. We briey sketch the idea of the necessity part of the proof.
If f is robustly implementable, then it is rationalizably implementable by Corollary 3. From ratio-
nalizable implementability, we then want to show that f satises strict robust monotonicity. We
consider a given and unacceptable deception . We start the process of iterative elimination and
stop it at a specic round, denoted by k. This round k is the rst round at which we can nd
an agent i, a true type prole i and a report 0i 2 i (i), such that a message, denoted by bmi,
which will survive the process of iterated elimination for type 0i, fails to survive the k-th round of
elimination for type i. We then show that the elimination of message bmi at round k implies that
the social choice function f satises strict robust monotonicity with respect to the deception .
Briey, if bmi survives the process of elimination for type 0i, the message bmi acts in the mechanism
so as to report a payo¤ type 0i. If it is eliminated at round k for payo¤ type i, then this means
that for any belief agent i has over the remaining agents, there exists a message mi which leads to
an allocation through g which is strictly preferred by agent i when he has a payo¤ type i. The
signicance of round k being the rst round for which such an elimination relative to the deception
 occurs, is that at this round, there do not yet exist any restrictions about message and payo¤ type
prole regarding the other agents deception. The fact then that bmi can be eliminated allows us to
use full strength of the elimination argument to establish robust monotonicity. In the context of the
proof it is interesting to note that the key step from iterative elimination to robust monotonicity
is an argument which involves the early stages of the elimination process rather than the limit of
iteration process.
6 Extensions, Variations and Discussion
6.1 Lotteries, Pure Strategies and Bayesian Implementation
In this section, we discuss how Theorem 1 is related to the classic literature on Bayesian implemen-
tation developed by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson
(1991). These authors asked whether it was possible to implement a social choice function in equi-
librium on a xed type space T .11 These authors analyzed the classic problem where attention
was restricted to pure strategy equilibria and deterministic mechanisms. The assumption entails
11They allowed for more general social choice sets, but we restrict attention to functions for our comparison.
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that the social choice function is a mapping f : ! Z and the mechanism g :M ! Z. Note that
in this classical approach it was not necessary to even dene agents preferences over lotteries and
they certainly did not e¤ect implementability.
Having xed a type space, the natural notion of a pure strategy deception on the xed type
space is a collection  = (1; :::; I), with each i : Ti ! Ti. Thus  : T ! T is dened
by  (t) = (i (ti))
I
i=1. The key monotonicity notion, translated into our language, is then the
following:
Denition 15 (Bayesian Monotonicity)
Social choice function f satises Bayesian monotonicity on type space T if, for every deception 
with f



















k (i (ti) ; t i) ;b  t0i; t i bi (t i) t0i ; 8t0i:
Jackson shows that this condition is necessary for Bayesian implementation, and that a slight
strengthening, Bayesian monotonicity no veto, is su¢ cient. We can also show that our robust
monotonicity condition is equivalent to the requirement that Bayesian monotonicity is satised on
all type spaces.
Proposition 8 (Equivalence)
Social choice function f satises Bayesian monotonicity on every type space if and only if it satises
robust monotonicity.
The equivalence is established by a constructive proof via a specic type space. The constructive
element is the identication of a type space on which Bayesian monotonicity is guaranteed to fail
if robust monotonicity fails. It is worthwhile to note that the specic type space is much smaller
than the universal type space. The proof of this result is in the appendix of the working paper
version, Bergemann and Morris (2008b).
In some sense, the notion of robustness is more subtle in the context of full rather than par-
tial implementation. With partial implementation, i.e. truthtelling in the direct mechanism, the
universal type space is by denition the most di¢ cult type space to obtain truthtelling. In the
universal type space, every agent has the maximal number of possible misreports and hence the
designer faces the maximal number of incentive constraints. In the context of full implementation,
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the trade-o¤ is ambiguous. As a larger type space contains by denition more types, it o¤ers every
agent more possibilities to misreport. But then, just as a larger type space made truthtelling more
di¢ cult to obtain, the other equilibria might also cease to exist after the introduction of addi-
tional types. This second part o¤ers the possibility that larger type spaces facilitate rather than
complicate the full implementation problem.
But note that this line of argument would establish the necessity of robust implementation if the
planner is restricted to deterministic mechanisms (a disadvantage) but he can assume that agents
follow pure strategies (an advantage). How do these assumptions matter?
First, observe that the advantage of restricting attention to pure strategies goes away completely
when we require implementation on all type spaces: if there is a mixed strategy equilibrium that
results in a socially sub-optimal outcome on some type space, we can immediately construct a larger
type space (purifying the original equilibrium) where the socially sub-optimal outcome is played in
a pure strategy equilibrium. Thus our robust analysis conveniently removes that unfortunate gap
between pure and mixed strategy implementation that has plagued the implementation literature.
We use the extension to stochastic mechanisms in just two places. Ex post incentive compati-
bility and robust monotonicity would remain necessary conditions even if we restricted attention to
deterministic mechanisms (the arguments would be unchanged). But, as we note in Footnote 10,
even if lotteries were not used in the implementing mechanism, the implied robust monotonicity con-
dition would involve lotteries (as rewards for whistle-blowers). But if lotteries were not allowed, our
su¢ ciency argument would then require a slightly strengthened version of the robust monotonicity
condition, with the lottery y replaced by a deterministic outcome. Our su¢ ciency argument also
uses lotteries under Rules 1 and 2. As in a recent paper by Benoit and Ok (2008) on complete
information implementation, we use lotteries to signicantly weaken the su¢ cient conditions, so
that we require only the conditional NTI property in addition to EPIC and robust monotonicity. If
we did not allow lotteries in this part of the argument, we would require a much stronger economic
condition in the spirit of Jacksons Bayesian monotonicity no vetocondition. We have developed
combined robust monotonicity and economic conditions (not reported here) su¢ cient for interim
implementation on all full support types spaces. However, an additional complication is that, with-
out lotteries in the implementing mechanism, we cannot establish su¢ ciency on type spaces where
agents have disjoint supports.
It is possible to construct a simple example where EPIC and robust monotonicity are not
su¢ cient for robust monotonicity without lotteries by taking the coordination example of Section
3.6 but removing the outcomes z and z0. As we show in the Appendix (Section 7.3), robust
implementation is then not possible in this example despite the fact that the social choice function
selects a unique strictly Pareto-dominant outcome at every type prole.
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6.2 Ex Post and Robust Implementation
In contrast to our earlier results in Bergemann and Morris (2005b), where we showed that robust
partial implementation is equivalent to ex post incentive compatibility, robust implementation is
in general a more demanding notion of implementation than ex post equilibrium implementation.
The following simple example, introduced by Palfrey and Srivastava (1989), is useful to relate the
di¤erent implementation notions and understand the role of interdependent types. In this example,
there are three agents and each agent has two possible payo¤ types, a or b. There are two
possible choices for society, a or b. All agents have identical preferences. If a majority of agents
(i.e., at least two) are of type y, then every agent gets utility 1 from outcome y and utility 0 from
the other outcome. The social choice function agrees with the common preferences of the agents.
Thus f : fa; bg3 ! fa; bg satises f () = y if and only if # fi : i = yg  2.
Clearly, ex post incentive compatibility is not a problem in this example. The problem is that
in the direct mechanism- where all agents simply announce their types - there is the possibility
that all agents will choose to always announce a. Since no agent expects to be pivotal, he has no
incentive to truthfully announce his type when he is in fact b. What happens if we allow more
complicated mechanisms?
If there were complete information about agentspreferences, then the social choice function is
clearly implementable: the social planner could pick an agent, say agent 1, and simply follow that
agents recommendation.
But suppose instead that there is incomplete information about agentspreferences. In partic-
ular, suppose it is common knowledge that each agents type is b with independent probability q,
with q2 > 12 . This example fails the Bayesian monotonicity condition of Postlewaite and Schmeidler
(1986) and Jackson (1991). Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) observe that it is also not possible to
implement in undominated Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this example.
Bergemann and Morris (2008a) have analyzed the alternative more robust solution concept
of ex post equilibrium in this context. It is easy to construct an augmented mechanism whose
only ex post equilibrium delivers the social choice function. Let each agent send a message mi 2
fa; bg  ftruth, lieg, with the interpretation that an agent is announcing his own type and also
sends the message truthif he thinks that others are telling the truth and sends the message lie
if he thinks that someone is lying. Outcome y is implemented if a majority claim to be type y and
all agents announce truth; or if either 1 or 3 agents claim to be type y and at least one agent
reports lying.
There is a truthtelling ex post equilibrium where each agent truthfully announces his type and
also announces truth. Now suppose there exists an ex post equilibrium such that at some type
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prole, the desired outcome is not chosen. Note that whatever the announcements of the other
agents, each agent always has the ability to determine the outcome y, by sending the message lie
and - given the announcements of the other agents - choosing his message so that an odd number
of agents have claimed to be type y. So this is not consistent with ex post equilibrium.
Robust implementation is impossible in this example. Consider the type space where there is
common knowledge that whenever an agent is type y, he assigns probability 12 to both of the other
agents being type y0 6= y and probability 12 to one being type y and the other being y
0. Thus every
type of every agent thinks there is a 50% chance that outcome a is better and a 50% chance that
b is better. Evidently, there is no way of designing a mechanism that ensures that agents do not
fully pool. But if they fully pool, robust implementation is not possible.
6.3 Extensions
The previous sections examined the importance of our assumptions about lotteries over outcomes
and restrictions on mechanisms. We also restricted attention in our main analysis to the case of
discrete but innite pure outcomes Z, payo¤ types i and types Ti. While most of our results
would extend naturally to more general Z, i and Ti, the formal treatment of non-compact type
spaces would raise technical issues that we have chosen to avoid.
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7 Appendix A
7.1 Robust Monotonicity and Dual Robust Monotonicity
Lemma 2
1. If f satises (strict) robust monotonicity, then f satises dual (strict) robust monotonicity.
2. If deterministic outcomes and payo¤ types are nite, and f satises dual (strict) robust
monotonicity, then f satises (strict) robust monotonicity.
Proof. (1.) follows immediately from the denitions. To prove (2.), suppose that outcomes
and payo¤ types are nite and that f satises dual (strict) robust monotonicity. Then for every
unacceptable deception , there exist i, i, 0i 2 i (i) such that, for all 0 i 2  i, there exists a



















































By the equivalence between strict domination and never a best response (see Theorem 2.10 in Gale
(1989)), we have that there exists y 2 Y with
ui (y














. This establishes (strict) robust monotonicity.
7.2 A Badly Behaved Mechanism
The example illustrates the gap between the necessary and su¢ cient conditions in Proposition 7.
Specically, it shows that there can be an equilibrium for every type space T in a mechanism, yet
SM does not satisfy the ex post best response property.
In the example, there are two agents and there is complete information, so each agent has a
unique type. There are a nite number of outcomes Z = fa; b; cg. The payo¤s are given by the
following table:
a b c
agent 1 0  1 +1
agent 2 0 0 0
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The planners choice (in the unique payo¤ state) is a. Thus it is trivial to robustly implement the
social choice function. But suppose that the planner chooses the following (strange) mechanism:
M1 = f1; 2; 3; :::g, M2 = f1; 2g and
g (m1;m2) =
8>><>>:
a, if m1 = 1























































Thus the agents are playing the following complete information game:
m1=m2 1 2
1 0; 0 0; 0
2  1; 0 0; 0








Now on any type space, there is always an equilibrium where agent 1 chooses action 1 and agent
2 chooses action 1, and outcome a is chosen. Moreover, on any type space, in any equilibrium,
outcome a is always chosen: if agent 1 ever has a best response not to play 1 then he has no best
response. So he always plays 1 in equilibrium. Thus the trivial social choice function is robustly
implemented by this mechanism.
While only message 1 survives iterated deletion of never best responses for agent 1, both mes-
sages survive iterated deletion of never best responses for agent 2. Thus we have SM1 = f1g and
SM2 = f1; 2g. Note that SM satises the interim best response property, see Denition 13, but not
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the ex post best response property, see Denition 12. For we observe that
u1 (g (1; 2)) = u1 (a) = 0 <
1
2
= u1 (g (2; 2)) ,
violating the ex post best response property.
The insight of the example is that the quantier for every type space T does not necessarily
guarantee that all actions which will be chosen with positive probability in some equilibrium and
for some type space, will also be chosen with probability one in some equilibrium for some type
space. For this reason, the quantier for every type space T does not allow us to establish a
local, i.e. ex post best response property of every action in SM.
7.3 Coordination Example Continued
The nal example is the pure coordination game, which we rst considered in Section 3.6, but
without the additional allocations, z and z0. It illustrates the importance of lotteries for robust
implementation. The example will satisfy EPIC and robust monotonicity, yet it cannot be robustly
implemented without the use of lotteries. On the other hand the preferences clearly satisfy the
conditional NTI property, and hence the su¢ cient conditions for robust implementation would be
satised with lotteries.
As in the example in Section 3.6, the payo¤s of the player are given by (15) and the social choice
function f is given by (16). The social choice function is strictly ex post incentive compatible but
there is another equilibrium in the direct mechanismwhere each agent misreports his type, and
each agent gets a payo¤ of 1.
Robust monotonicity is clearly satised even if the rewards Yi ( i) are restricted to the deter-
ministic allocations Z. We will show that robust implementation is not possible even in an innite
mechanism if we restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms. Fix a mechanismM. Let
Si (i) = fmi : g (mi;mj) = f (i; j) for some mj ; jg ,
be the set of messages for agent i which would select the allocation recommended by the social
choice function for some mj ; j . We now show by induction that, Si (i)  Ski (i) for all k using
the structure of the payo¤s. Suppose that this is true for k. Then for any mi 2 Si (i)  Ski (i),
there exists mj 2 Sj (j)  Skj (j) such that g (mi;mj) = f (i; j). Thus there does not exist














> ui (g (mi;mj) ; (i; j)) = 3.
So mi 2 Sk+1i (i).
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Thus we must have that (m1;m2) 2 S1 (1)S2 (2) implies g (m1;m2) = f (1; 2). Let mi ()





=2 Ski (i) .




2 Sk 12 (2) by denition of k. If agent 1 was




, we know that he








is deleted for type 1 at




























S2 (2), a contradiction.
The example uses the fact that the social choice function always selects an outcome that is
strictly Pareto-optimal and - paradoxically - it is this feature which inhibits rationalizable imple-
mentation in the current example. Borgers (1995) proves the impossibility of complete information
implementation of non-dictatorial social choice functions in iteratively undominated strategies when
the set of feasible preference proles includes such unanimous preference proles and the argument
here is reminiscent of Borgersargument.
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8 Appendix B
8.1 Robust Monotonicity and Robust Measurability
In this section we document that robust measurability neither implies nor is implied by robust
monotonicity. This observation parallels an observation in the standard Bayesian implementation
literature. Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) showed that Bayesian incentive compatibility and a
measurability conditions, henceforth referred to as Abreu-Matsushima measurability are neces-
sary conditions for virtual implementation in Bayesian Nash equilibrium in well-behaved mecha-
nisms. Serrano and Vohra (2005) describe a virtual monotonicitycondition - a weakening of the
Bayesian monotonicity condition of Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Jackson (1991) - which,
together with Bayesian incentive compatibility, is necessary and su¢ cient for virtual implementa-
tion in Bayesian Nash equilibrium using perhaps badly behaved mechanisms. Virtual monotonicity
must therefore be a weakening of Abreu-Matsushima measurability. Example 2 in Serrano and
Vohra (2001) exhibits an environment where all non-constant social choice functions fail Abreu-
Matsushima measurability fails but all social choice functions satisfy virtual monotonicity and
many satisfy Bayesian monotonicity. On the other hand, the social choice function allocating a
single object e¢ ciently under private values will fail Bayesian monotonicity (any e¢ cient alloca-
tion mechanism will allow undesirable equilibria) but will satisfy Abreu-Matsushima measurability.
Thus Bayesian monotonicity neither implies nor is implied by Abreu-Matsushima measurability.
Example 1: Robust Measurability holds while Robust Monotonicity fails Consider









. The allocation space is given byX = fx1; x2; x3; x4g. We display below the payo¤









1a 1 1 1
2a 1 1 0








1a 0 0 1
2a 1 1 1








1a 1 1 0
2a 0 0 1






























Given the payo¤ matrix given by (27), it is immediate to show that the limit set of sepa-













. The limit set is obtained by observing that a subset 	j separates a subset 	i
whenever #	i  #	j and #	i > 1 but not if #	i < #	j or #	i = 1. Thus while at the 0-th
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level, the inseparable sets of agent i, 0i , will consist of all subsets of payo¤ types, the 1-st level
of inseparable sets of agent i, 1i , will only consist of all sets of payo¤ types with cardinality at
most 2, and the 2-nd level of inseparable sets of agent i, 2i , will consist exactly of all singletons.
It follows that the robust measurability condition does not impose any restrictions on the social
choice functions.
We illustrate the process of separation for 	a = a and 	b = b. A given type a has a









expected utility of type a with belief a (b) over the allocations fx1; x2; x3; x4g is then given by











































fact, for every pair among the three types, we can nd identical preference proles, but not for the
triple itself.
We next show that the robust monotonicity condition fails for some social choice functions f .






1a x1 x2 x2
2a x2 x2 x2
3a x2 x2 x3
(29)
For the given payo¤ environment (27) and the social choice function (29), we consider the
deception with i (i) = i for all i and i. By symmetry of the payo¤s and the deceptions across






















































































































































As we evaluate the inequalities (30) for the given payo¤ environment (27) and the social choice




















































But as the value of the last value of the misreport is 1 for agent a, it follows that we cannot nd
a reward which strictly exceeds 1. It follows that the robust monotonicity condition is violated in
this example.
The di¤erence between robust measurability and robust monotonicity here stems from the fact
the di¤erent types of agent i could be separated in the payo¤ environment with allocations which
were not called upon by the social choice function. The robust monotonicity condition was therefore
limited to use the allocation x4 as a reward, but here it failed to provide a higher utility than the
one provided by the social choice function under some report proles.
Example 2: Robust Measurability fails but Robust Monotonicity holds There are two
agents, a and b, and each agent i has two types, i and 0i. There are six pure outcomes, X =





a 2; 2  2; 0




a  2; 0 2; 2




a 0; 0 0; 2




a 0; 2 0; 0






a 0; 0 0; 0




a 1; 1 1; 1
0a 1; 1 1; 1
(33)
Suppose agent a assigns equal probability to each type of agent b. Then - whatever his payo¤














. A symmetric argument establishes that
a does not separate b. We conclude that every pair of types of each agent is not separable and
hence only constant social choice functions satisfy robust measurability.







Given the social choice function f , it is immediate to verify that strict ex post incentive compatibility
and robust monotonicity both hold. To verify the latter, observe that consider a deception with
i
ei = i for some ei. Without loss of generality, assume that a (a) = a. Now type a
reporting 0a can be o¤ered outcome x6 to report the deception. Given the denition of robust
monotonicity, we need to verify that













































































Given the payo¤ described in (32) and (33) and given the social choice function f , we can verify
that with y = x6, we have:


















































































The social choice function f can be robustly implemented with the following mechanism. Agent a



















, then g (ma;mb) = f (ma;mb); if ma 2 f1; 2; 3; ::::g, then g (ma;mb) is the lottery
putting probability 1ma on x5 and probability 1  
1
ma
on x6. Now truth-telling survives iterated
deletion of never best responses. Also, (i) sending message 2 with an expected payo¤ of 12 is always
a better response for agent a than misreporting his type with a payo¤ 0; given thruthtelling by
agent b and (ii) choosing ma + 1 with an expected payo¤ of mama+1 is always a better response for
agent a than sending message ma with an expected payo¤: ma 1ma . So player a must tell the truth
and truth-telling is then the only best response for agent b.
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8.2 Bayesian Monotonicity
This subsection contains the proof of Proposition 8 which establishes the equivalence between robust
monotonicity and Bayesian monotonicity on every type space by means of a constructive proof (via
a specic type space).
Proof of Proposition 8. ()) We will show that if robust monotonicity fails, we can construct a
type space where Bayesian monotonicity fails. The argument will be constructive.
Fix an unacceptable deception . Suppose that robust monotonicity fails. Then for each i, i,



















































































ui (y; (i;  i)) .
(39)






given by (37) for which Bayesian







: i 2 i and 0i 2 i (i)
	
; thus there exists a bijection 1i : T
1























. Second, agent i has a set of "pseudo-complete information types"




i ! . The type corresponding





Slightly more formally, we have
Ti = T
1
i [ T 2i .






, then bi (ti) = i;
if ti 2 T 2i and 2i (ti) = , then bi (ti) = i.
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i (t i) [ti] =


















If ti 2 T 2i and 2i (ti) = , then
i (t i) [ti] =
8<: 1; if t i 2 T
1
















































Since  was unacceptable, we must have that f
b (t) 6= f b ( (t)) for some t. Thus the
Bayesian monotonicity condition (Denition 15) for this type space requires that there exist i, ti





















h (i (ti) ; t i) ;b  t00i ; t i bi (t i) t00i  ; 8t00i : (41)
The ti cannot be an element of T 2i , because such a type does not expect any deviation from truth-








































































































































































condition (42) becomes X
 i2 i




































. But these latter claims contradict our initial
assumption that robust monotonicity fails (i.e., (38)). Thus Bayesian monotonicity fails for this
type space and the claim is proved.
(() Suppose f satises robust monotonicity. Fix any type space T and any deception  with
f
b (t) 6= f b ( (t)) for some t. Dene  by
i (i) =
n
0i : 9ti such that bi (ti) = i and bi (i (ti)) = 0io .
Deception  is unacceptable, so by robust monotonicity, there exist i, i, 0i 2 i (i) such that for






































Now choose any ti such that bi (ti) = i and bi (i (ti)) = 0i. For every (mis-)report 0 i, we now
derive a distribution over payo¤ types  i which represents the likelihood that the report 0 i comes












ft i:bj(j(tj))=0j and bj(tj)=j ; 8j 6=ig bi (t i) [ti]P
ft i:bj(j(tj))=0j , 8j 6=ig bi (t i) [ti]
: (45)







hb i (t i) ;  i hb i (t i)ii if t0i = i (ti)
f
b (t0i; t i) if otherwise . (46)
To establish Bayesian monotonicity, it is enough to show that the two inequalities of Bayesian






















h (i (ti) ; t i) ;b  t0i; t i bi (t i) [ti] ; 8t0i:
By inserting the posterior beliefs  i and the rewards h (t
0
i; t i), as dened above in (45) and (46)






































































b (t0i; t i) ;b (t0i; t i) bi (t i) [t0i] ; if t0i 6= i (ti)
Now y
hb i (t i) ;  i hb i (t i)ii 2 Yi b i (t i) implies (48).
The proof may appear rather intricate in its details. We next give a brief outline of the basic
steps to show how interim implies robust monotonicity. The proof proceeds by contrapositive. We
start with an unacceptable deception  which by hypothesis fails robust monotonicity and hence
satises the inequalities (38) and (39). For the given deception , we then create a type space,
consisting of two components for every agent i. The rst component for agent i is created by the






, where the rst entry is the true payo¤ type and the second
entry is a feasible deception (under ), or 0i 2 i (i). For this reason, we refer to these types as






there exists at least one particular payo¤ prole 0 i
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which acts as a misreport. Under the deception , this payo¤ prole 0 i could have been reported







is given by simply adopting  i
 

i; 0i . The second component consists of pseudo
complete information types, described by ti =  2 . Each such type has a belief that assigns
probability one to the event that the true payo¤ prole is given by  and that all other agents
report the deception type (j ; j), and hence the pseudoin the labelling.
Given this type space Ti, we then consider a particular deception i : Ti ! Ti. The deception
i is localized around the deception typesand the pseudo complete information typesreport
thruthfully. The deception i consists of agent i always reporting his deception type rather than












. We then verify whether f is interim monotone under .
The existence of the pseudo complete information types  forces the interim incentive compatibility
conditions to reduce to ex post incentive compatibility conditions. This guarantees the hypothesis
in the robust monotonicity notion, namely inequality (38), and thus leads to the conclusion in form
of the inequalities (39). But then we obtain a contradiction to the reward condition of interim
monotonicity, unless the hypothesis for the interim monotonicity condition, namely f 6= f  , is
not satised, i.e. f = f   holds, but of course this implies that  is acceptable.
49
References
Abreu, D., and H. Matsushima (1992a): Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated
Strategies: Complete Information,Econometrica, 60, 9931008.
(1992b): Virtual Implementation In Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete
Information,Discussion paper, Princeton University and University of Tokyo.
Battigalli, P. (1999): Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games,Discussion Paper
ECO 99/17, European University Institute.
Battigalli, P., and M. Siniscalchi (2003): Rationalization and Incomplete Information,
Advances in Theoretical Economics, 3, Article 3.
Benoit, J., and E. Ok (2008): Nash Implementation Without No Veto,Games and Economic
Behavior, forthcoming.
Bergemann, D., and S. Morris (2005a): Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type
Spaces,Discussion Paper 1519, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
(2005b): Robust Mechanism Design,Econometrica, 73, 17711813.
(2007): Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms,Discussion Paper 1561R, Cowles
Foundation, Yale University.
(2008a): Ex Post Implementation,Games and Economic Behavior, 63, 527566.
(2008b): Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms, Discussion paper, Cowles
Foundation, Yale University.
(2008c): Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation, Discussion
Paper 1609R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
Borgers, T. (1995): A Note on Implementation and Strong Dominance, in Social Choice,
Welfare and Ethics, ed. by W. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles, and N. Schoeld. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Brandenburger, A., and E. Dekel (1987): Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria,
Econometrica, 55, 13911402.
Chung, K.-S., and J. Ely (2001): E¢ cient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdepen-
dent Valuations,Discussion paper, Northwestern University.
50
Dekel, E., D. Fudenberg, and S. Morris (2007): Interim Correlated Rationalizability,
Theoretical Economics, 2, 1540.
Duggan, J. (1997): Virtual Bayesian Implementation,Econometrica, 65, 11751199.
Gale, D. (1989): The Theory of Linear Economic Models. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Hughes, G., and M. Creswell (1996): A New Introduction Into Modal Logic. Routledge, Lon-
don.
Jackson, M. (1991): Bayesian Implementation,Econometrica, 59, 461477.
Jackson, M. (1992): Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mecha-
nisms,Review of Economic Studies, 59, 757775.
Lipman, B. (1994): A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality,Games
and Economic Behavior, 6, 114129.
Palfrey, T., and S. Srivastava (1989): Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A
Solution to the Implementation Problem,Journal of Political Economy, 97, 668691.
Postlewaite, A., and D. Schmeidler (1986): Implementation in Di¤erential Information
Economies,Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 1433.
Serrano, R., and R. Vohra (2001): Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation,
Econometrica, 69, 785792.
(2005): A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation,Games and Economic
Behavior, 50, 312331.
Wilson, R. (1987): Game-Theoretic Analyses of Trading Processes, in Advances in Economic
Theory: Fifth World Congress, ed. by T. Bewley, pp. 3370, Cambridge. Cambridge University
Press.
51
